In the start of the
second millennium, the year 2000, Russia started re-emerging as a great
military power and China became an economic giant. The United States perceived
such developments as a challenge to the established world order. The US
prepared a comprehensive strategy to contest great-power competitions in Asia,
Europe and the Middle East. Capitalizing on the local dynamics in South Asia,
the US picked India as its strategic partner to contain China. The US also
hoped that it would eventually pull India out of the Russian camp and hence
deprive Russia of a major defense client
In 2005, United States
signed a civil nuclear deal with India and described it a pivotal moment for
the beginning of a strategic relationship between India and the US. India
became a strategic ally and partner in Asia. To appease India, as an immediate
reward, the US turned a blind eye to Indian proxies against Pakistan.
In 2015, the US allowed
India to have a Rapid Reaction Cell inside the Pentagon with seven officials
representing various wings of the US Department of Defense to speed up defense
deals, liaisons and sharing of intelligence. In 2016, US President Donald Trump
went a step further and even changed the name of US Pacific command to
Indo-Pacific Command to hint more prominent role for Indian armed forces. US
believed India was fully aligned with US interests and was no in the Russian
camp. However, over a period of time, it all proved an illusion. The US was
disappointed with hefty Indian defense deals with Russia and with Indian voting
patterns in the UN General Assembly.
The US took 13 long years
to understand that India is not its strategic partner. Consequently, this month
the Pentagon moved the “India office” (Rapid Reaction Cell) out of the iconic
building to some 10 kilometers away in another administrative building, and
reduced its workforce. The immediate cause of such doing is not known, neither
any of the countries are discussing the same.
However, visible signs of non-alignment between US and Indian interests
are quite distinct.
Indian spineless
handling of the Doklam standoff with China was not a as significant a setback
to the US perception of India as compared to subsequent Indian dealing with
China. Lionheart Narendra Modi at the Wuhan summit in April not only ignored
Chinese construction activity in the Hamelin region rather sought a more
conciliatory position with President Xi Jinping. Modi has desperately tried to
reset relations with China, which had soured after the Doklam standoff. Modi
even invited Chinese companies to invest and collaborate with India. New Delhi
saw it more advantageous to stand neutral instead of becoming Washington’s
counterweight to Beijing.
The Indian leadership
neither feels threatened by China, due to the intervening high mountains of the
Tibetan Plateau, nor willing to contest China militarily because of the
apparent disparity of military and economic resources. India actually wants to
end “Chinese influence” in South Asia and wants to punish smaller neighbors
cooperating with China. The US was misled due to this little convergence of
interests in South Asia forgetting that Indians are US competitors, not allies.
Indians are optimistic that India, one of the largest by population and
seventh-largest by land area, will soon be a superpower in a multipolar world.
Why should they then be a junior partner to the United States? Indians have
developed far to bigger ambitions in the region and beyond.
The BJP led Indian
government also has a complicated relationship with Middle Eastern Muslim
countries. India shares Israel’s perception that Muslims are a troubled
community and a danger for world peace. The Indian ruling party also grossly
ill-treats its Muslim community at home, however, it also successfully
manipulates huge overseas employment quota from wealthy Middle Eastern Muslim
countries.
India is the leading
importer of Iranian oil, and a significant investor in Iran through its
Chabahar Port project, so it has refused to give in to US demands. Likewise,
the Indians have greatly benefited from the US presence in Afghanistan in
trade, defense deals and diplomacy. However, when it comes to funding the war
effort or contributing troops for peacemaking efforts in Afghanistan, it always
spooked.
India does not intend
to cease its arms imports from Russia. It is concluding a $5.5 billion purchase
of the Russian S-400 long-range air-defense system despite US objections.
Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman claimed that India has “a
time-tested relationship” with Russia and further reiterated that India only
recognizes UN sanctions, not unilateral US sanctions. This incident clearly
shows that the two countries’ interests are not aligned. Indians have also
signed a MoU for the purchase of five nuclear power plants from Russia.
Backing India to
counter China is a flawed US policy. India has neither the political will nor
the capacity to contest China militarily. India uses the China card to milk the
US and West and uses it against Pakistan and smaller countries in the region.
The US will know true colors of India after she is able to joins Nuclear Supplier
group or attain the membership of UN Security Council.
For the USA, the best
bet is to improve relations with Pakistan and China and get over the fever of
containing China which is neither practical nor necessary. China and Russia are
also competitors and not allies; hence
will pose no significant threat to the interests of the United States in the
foreseeable future.
Considering the
continuous conflict of interests between Washington and New Delhi, and partly
due to greater preoccupation with conflicts in the Middle East and East Asia,
the Trump administration seems to have crystallized its relationship with
India. The administration’s increased engagement with Pakistan on the issue of
Afghanistan might have also come at the expense of Indo-US ties and ouster of the “India office” from the
Pentagon.
India is not the
natural ally of the US; it is as clear as a midsummer sky. White House
understands it earlier the better.
