Ever since
India and the United States concluded their 2005 civil nuclear agreement, which
essentially recognized India as the sixth nuclear weapons power in the global
order, Pakistan has argued for a similar agreement with the US despite its
dubious record of proliferation.
Pakistan
seeks parity with India in every realm, even if its size and history make that
a questionable project. Undeterred, it has mounted a massive diplomatic
campaign in western capitals over the last several years to block India from
reaching the next stage of legitimacy for its nuclear programme, i.e. entry
into the four international technology-control regimes starting with the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Islamabad’s
anti-India campaign can be considered somewhat successful since it has managed
to chip away at the resistance against its own proliferation record while
raising questions about accepting India as a de facto nuclear power.
Conventional wisdom in Washington, which once considered Pakistan as a nuclear
pariah because of A.Q. Khan’s enterprise of selling nuclear technology to Iran,
Libya and North Korea, has shifted to finding ways of rationalizing its
behavior.
The reasons
are two-fold: Pakistan is apparently making 20 nuclear weapons a year and in a
decade could amass the world’s third largest arsenal. Some US experts believe
that something must be done to treat this suicidal/homicidal behavior.
The second
reason is the residual desire among many American non-proliferation experts –
encouraged by the curtailment of Iran’s nuclear programme – to have a second go
at India and impose conditions on its nuclear programme by way of Pakistan.
They say India got away too easily in 2005 – despite their considerable efforts
to scuttle the nuclear deal – and that its subsequent actions to implement the
terms of the agreement have “fallen short of expectations.”
It is against
this background that a new report by two premier think tanks — the Carnegie
Endowment and the Stimson Center — must be considered. “A Normal Nuclear
Pakistan,” released last week, reads like an endorsement of Pakistan’s position
and an apology for its army nurturing anti-India terrorists. Incidentally, the
report prefers the word “extremists.”
Equally
importantly, the report hyphenates India and Pakistan, a tendency declared
outdated and pointless some time ago that should no longer find favor anymore
with people in the know.
But it does. The report hyphenates India and Pakistan
to such an extent, it seems aimed more at making Indian entry into the NSG
tougher while it pushes Pakistan’s case.
It begins by
plaintively asking: “Will Pakistan be forever penalized because of the illicit
activities of A.Q. Khan and his proliferation network? Will Pakistan remain
outside the nonproliferation “mainstream” despite its concerted efforts to
quash the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan and other extremist groups, because
it is viewed as an accomplice to still others that carry out acts of violence
against India – acts that could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons?”
The short
answer should be “yes” unless Pakistan firmly shuts down its terrorist
enterprise.
“Or can
Pakistan break from its past, change negative perceptions and become a “normal”
nuclear state – or at least as “normal as India…?”
The short
answer should be “no” unless it abandons its revisionist stance and proves it
over years.
But the
report’s authors, Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, take a journey of
justification on Pakistan’s behalf, treating the terrorism it sponsors with
half-shut eyes. They almost give the Pakistan army a free pass for sending
jihadis into India, and appear to treat the venture as hearsay. Their narrow
focus on Pakistan and how it can enter the nuclear mainstream to the exclusion
of the wider problem of state sponsorship of terrorism is problematic.
The authors
don’t ask that all terrorist groups be dismantled, leading one to presume that
they agree with the Pakistani view that terrorists (LeT and others) attacking
India will somehow have the good sense not to steal the country’s nuclear
secrets.
They seem to
approve Pakistan’s position that the TTP must be curbed first because it acts
against the state and is more likely to endanger the country’s expanding
nuclear arsenal. Yet, they write that a battle could be triggered by an attack
by groups such as the LeT, but without demanding action against it.
They offer
five conditions that Pakistan must meet to become a “normal” nuclear state:
shift from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence, limit production of
short-range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, allow negotiations on the
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, separate civilian and military nuclear
programmes and finally, sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting
for India.
The
accommodative stance is unlikely to go anywhere with Pakistani generals who have
understood that keeping the west scared is one way to keep the money flowing
and the attention from waning. It is best exemplified by Brig Gen. Zahir Kazmi
who is quoted in the report saying “It is the nonproliferation regime that much
be normalized, not Pakistan.”
The message
is clear: Pakistan will continue its dangerous and destabilizing behavior
unless the world community gives in to its demands. This report goes a long
distance towards showing how.
What’s
distressing is that Krepon and Dalton maintain a parallel track of criticism
against India where they claim that India’s “net contributions to stabilizing
the global nuclear order have been modest, at best.” They further claim that
the steps India needed to take after the nuclear deal have “fallen short of
expectations.”
What is more
noteworthy is that the Obama Administration supports integration of Pakistan
“into the international nonproliferation regime,” according to a US-Pakistan
joint statement issued on June 2, 2015.
There is no doubt that the State Department has a set of people
entrenched in the nonproliferation bureau who are didactic and strongly oppose
any favors to India. At the very least they may want the same for Pakistan.
There is
little appetite in the international community for legitimizing Pakistan’s
nuclear programme, which while running at full steam, has added dangerous new
elements (tactical nuclear weapons and short-range delivery missiles(.
Unsurprisingly,
the country that closely mirrors Pakistan’s position is China. But and now it
seems the US position may also be moving in that direction.
