(By: Afrah Jamal)
They say that ‘the Taliban are coming to Islamabad’ was a common refrain
among some diplomatic circles. They cannot be faulted for having such a stark
worldview. From 2007 onwards the region registered a dramatic spike in terror
and the world feared for the integrity of a nuclear armed nation in the face of
a rapidly deteriorating law and order situation.
Some might argue that now that Pakistan has finally taken the war to the
enemy within, a modicum of peace seems to have descended. Zarb-e-Azb, classified
as a full scale operation against terrorists of all shades and denominations
enters its third year. And a prominent name linked to JuD is finally under
arrest.
Tracking battlefront gains can be tricky since the operations are still
ongoing. There have been rough patches along the way. And the nation suffered
tragic setbacks with devastating attacks on police academies, shrines and
hospitals.
Back home the military’s track record came into question every time a
suicide bomber got through, while the world continued to gauge its performance
from a special set of parameters.
The Afghan Taliban’s misuse of Pak territory had been cited as the
reason for withholding $300 million reimbursements. The sight of radical groups
(ASWJ) etc pottering about did not exactly inspire confidence and a selective
targeting approach (alleged) naturally tipped the scale of global opinion
adversely. The spotlight refused to shift from the strange categorization of
terror syndicates that often led to a blurring of lines between good & bad
Taliban.
Foreign media remained dismissive of any claims regarding Kabul’s role
in stoking the fire within Pak borders even in its most balanced pieces like
‘Pakistani Militants and the State: Friends, Foes, and Frenemies’ (Jul 5, 2016)
by Stephen Tankel, senior editor War on Rocks. Consequently, it failed to
factor in imprints of RAW, NDS, or MOIS occasionally spotted in the mix.
Admittedly, the fear of blowback that prevented military strategists
from confronting certain threats may have been real. Pakistanis in the
crosshairs of terrorists however would have preferred that no such distinctions
are made. Blind-spots regarding jihadist outfits and Haqqanis only served to
muddy the waters, provide belligerent nations ammo to scapegoat Pakistan, forcing
allies to question their loyalties. Besides, such gambits tend to misfire. But
the other side of the picture that stays buried under the debris of distrust
and accusations of duplicity leaves gaps in the narrative.
Like when the Swat operation Rah-e-Rast dislodged HVT’s (High Value
Target) like Fazlullah, many who fled to Afghanistan, sought sanctuary later
directing attacks against the Pakistani state. Two observations have been
offered by Mr. Tankel to explain this phenomenon. One of them declares that
“…after years in which Afghanistan was on the receiving end of attacks by
Pakistan-supported militants, elements in the Afghan intelligence service (the
National Directorate of Security or NDS) reportedly began enabling these
cross-border attacks.”
The other insists that that the NDS involvement is unclear in this
scenario. Again, both Iranian and NDS connections with possible ties to RAW
(Indian spy agency) unearthed in a recent intelligence coup are left out.
Instead, the new Afghan President appears making overtures to Pakistani people
in the next passage. The casual remark that capacity strapped Afghan security
forces would be more focused on fighting insurgency within its borders than
facilitating terrorists using its soil to target Pakistan lets them off easy.
Also, an NDS hand in destabilizing its neighbor seems to be mere payback for
all that supposed meddling Pakistan did post Soviet withdrawal.
Since Pakistan’s Indian centric approach remains a key policy driver, it
becomes an important point of reference. Stephen conceded that New Delhi aided
abetted separatist movements in the past adding that there is no open source
evidence of Indian support. The article written after the arrest of a high
level Indian spy in Baluchistan probably means it discounts Pakistan’s case
against Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav and his coteries of spies.
Finally, the military’s alleged fondness for harboring proxies generally
attributed to the Indian bogie forever hovering in the background came up for
review. And when the dreaded anti-Shia LeJ were shown enjoying political
patronage, Pakistan’s crackdown on their lieutenants linked to ISIL was also
considered thereby maintaining a fairly even tone. But there’s a sudden shift
implying that “…..resurrecting JeM also had potential utility against India. In
January 2016, a team of JeM militants attacked the Pathankot Air Force
Station...” A key update where a joint team went to probe the incident and
Indian investigators cleared Pakistan of involvement was not a part of this
analysis.
Notwithstanding the fact that some of these elements may have been
wielded as anti-Qaeda propaganda machines in the past, their presence
jeopardized the ally’s position in leading the good fight and gave way to
dangerous speculations. They also widened sectarian rifts, endangering the
vision of a progressive nuclear state. No one cared about Taliban’s top
leadership vacationing in Iran when his motorcade was targeted the second he
entered Pakistani territory. Or that the road blocks to the peace were centered
in Kabul and reportedly funded by New Delhi.
The Pak-Afghan border fencing initiatives proposed by Pakistan that
sparked a fresh feud and led to casualties on both side was a case in point. At
its core lies the hope that such a structure can curtail the insurgent’s
ability to launch the cross border attacks. The cooperation and joint patrol
squads probably needed for this to succeed have yet to see the light of day.
The sight of banned organization members roaming the streets only added to the
trust deficit.
At this stage taking control of the runaway narrative may look
difficult. The implication that non-state actors have been used with state
connivance inevitably shaped perceptions about Pak military and stoked
suspicions about their motivations.
Consequently those hard won victories went unnoticed; as did the fallen
soldiers and citizens in line of fire. The cloud that hung over the
establishment followed them when they raised the plight of Kashmiri’s on
international forums, attempted to resolve trivial border disputes or tried to
get clearance for military hardware from the US Congress for fighting
insurgency. And though the visiting dignitaries no longer envisage a Taliban
invasion in the Capital, it continued to be seen as a dangerous destination –
its leadership beset with scandals, setbacks and, possibly surrounded by
saboteurs. Islamabad’s counter-narrative may take time to gain traction along
with its efforts at elevating Pakistan’s global stature.
